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CHAPTER 2 
State and Local Taxation 
GEORGE T. SHAW 
The 1972 SURVEY year was not one of significant events in Massachu-
setts in the field of state and local taxation. Of the several decisions ren-
dered in this area, some clarified the law or resolved statutory ambiguities 
while others added confusion or at least uncertainty. Legislation relating 
to tax matters was sparse and generally technical in nature. This chapter 
discusses the more important decisions and legislation. 
A. PROPERTY TAXES 
§2.1. Definition of real estate. The case of Board of Assessors v. 
Lynn Sand and Stone Co.1 revolved around the interplay of two statutes 
relating to the taxation of certain property of domestic manufacturing cor-
porations. General Laws, Chapter 59, Section 2 imposes a tax on "real 
estate" which in Section 3 is defined, for the purpose of taxation, to "in-
clude all land . . . and all buildings and other things erected thereon or 
affixed thereto." On the other hand, Section 5, Clause Sixteenth (3) 
of that Chapter exempts from taxation all property owned by a domestic 
manufacturing corporation "other than . .. real estate, poles and under-
ground conduits, wires and pipes" (emphasis added). The property in 
question consisted of several items of very large equipment, such as rock 
crushing and concrete mixing equipment, used in taxpayer's business of 
manufacturing and selling ready mixed concrete, crushed stone and 
asphalt filler. 
The assessors claimed that the items of property affixed to or erected 
on taxpayer's land or buildings were within the Section 3 definition of 
real estate and were subject to taxation as real estate under Section 2. 
The taxpayer, on the other hand, asserted that the equipment was 
"machinery" owned by a domestic manufacturing corporation and was 
therefore exempted under clause sixteenth of Section 5. 
The Court concluded that "all machinery of a domestic manufacturing 
corporation, at least so far as reasonably related to and used in manu-
facturing operations, must be treated as exempt from local taxation by 
virtue of G.L. c. 59, §5, Sixteenth (3) .... "2 Construing the legislative 
GEORGE T. SHAW is a member of the firm of Hemenway & Barnes, Boston. 
§2.1. I 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1771, 277 N.E.2d 97. 
2 Id. at 1773, 277 N.E.2d at 99. 
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history of the exemption to indicate a legislative intent to exempt all 
machinery of domestic manufacturing corporations, the Court deter-
mined that the relevant inquiry was whether the equipment was ma-
chinery.3 Finding that it was, the Court then held that the equipment 
was exempt from tax, notwithstanding its size and degree of attach-
ment to the land and notwithstanding that it may have become real 
estate as a matter of property law. 
It is interesting to compare this decision with that of the Board of 
Assessors v. B. A. Simeone, Inc:~ The Simeone case as well as the instant 
case which was then pending before the Court were discussed in the 
1971 SURVEy.5 In Simeone, a semiportable asphalt plant 55 feet high 
and weighing in excess of 100 tons was held not to be "erected or affixed" 
on real estate and hence was not subject to real property taxation. The 
rescript opinion in that case specifically left open the question of the 
domestic manufacturing corporation exemption. The facts in Simeone 
and Lynn Sand and Stone are so similar that it is difficult to under-
stand why the two cases were not decided on the same basis: either 
that the equipment in question was not real estate at all or that it was 
machinery which was exempt. Taken together, the two decisions are un-
satisfactory at best. 
In this writer's opinion, the relevant statutes mandate an analysis of 
whether a given item of property is real estate within the Section 3 defi-
nition. If it is, then it is taxable as real estate under Section 2; the Section 
5 exemption is then irrelevant because it specifically does not exempt 
real estate as defined in Section 3. As the assessors correctly stated, in 
order for the taxpayer's (and the Court's) position to be sustained, the 
Section 3 definition would have required language to the effect that 
"except that real estate for the purpose of taxation of manufacturing 
corporations shall not include machinery, whether or not erected upon 
or affixed to the land."6 Apparently the Court's decision in Lynn Sand 
and Stone now supplies that proviso. 
§2.2. Agreements to grant exemptions. In Mahony v. Board 01 As-
sessors,1 the taxpayer granted an easement over his land to the town for 
off-street parking purposes. The deed stated as a condition that the ease-
ment would continue only for so long as the land was exempt from the 
3 "There is no indication in the legislative or decisional history of c. 59, §5, 
Sixteenth, of any intention to draw refined distinctions between (a) easi'Iy remov-
able machinery and (b) more ponderous, bulky machinery items, which may have 
become real estate as a matter of property law, but whiah in a practical sense 
retain their characteristics as machinery. The machinery exemption adopted in 
1936 (c. 362) exempted machinery of domestic manufacturing corporations and 
in very broad and general terms. The exemption has not been construed technically 
or narrowly." Id. at 1774, 277 N.E.2d at 99. 
4 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 904, 269 N.E.2d 663. 
5 1971 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law, §3.13. 
6 Brief of the Board of Assessors, p. 9. 
§2.2. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1291, 285 N.E.2d 403. 
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assessment and collection of municipal taxes. The deed and the accep-
tance thereof, signed by the selectmen, were recorded and the land was 
in fact used for parking purposes. However, the taxpayer was assessed on 
the land by the assessors. He then brought a bill for declaratory judg-
ment to determine the validity and enforceability of the tax exemption 
provision of the deed. 
The Court held the provision invalid. It found that none of the stat-
utory tax exemptions were applicable. Furthermore, the assessors never 
assented to the condition in the deed, and the selectmen did not have 
authority to bind the town to any agreement purporting to grant a tax 
exemption: "A taxpayer is not entitled to an exemption unless he shows 
that he comes within either the express words or necessary implication 
of some statute conferring this privilege upon him."2 
Presumably the taxpayer was free to terminate the easement because 
of the town's noncompliance with one of the conditions of the grant, 
the granting of the tax exemption. The Court, however, did not feel 
compelled to resolve that question because the plaintiff had not attempted 
to terminate the easement. 
§2.3. Timely appeals to Appellate Tax Board. The Court again this 
year emphasized the need for meticulous care in filing appeals with the 
Appellate Tax Board from refusals of local assessors to abate local prop-
erty taxes. In Berkshire Gas Co. v. Board of Assessors,1 the taxpayer 
received notice on October 6 that the assessors had refused to abate a 
disputed property tax; on January 7 it filed an appeal with the Appellate 
Tax Board. By law, the appeal had to be filed "within three months 
after receiving the notice" of the refusal. 2 The Court concluded, based 
on earlier decisions, that the three months expired at midnight on January 
6. Accordingly, the appeal filed on January 7 was not timely, and the 
Court affirmed dismissal of the taxpayer's appeal. 
§2.4. Separate assessment of restricted land. Chapter 719 of the 
Acts of 19721 requires assessors to assess as a separate parcel land perma-
nently restricted under the scenic and recreational rivers act,2 the coastal 
or inland wetlands acts,S and the conservation and historical restriction 
act.'" How this new requirement will be applied by assessors is problem-
atical. In theory, land restricted as to use and permissible development 
in accordance with any of these acts is worth less than the same land 
unrestricted. However, proving to the satisfaction of skeptical assessors 
2 Id. at 1294, 285 N.E.2d at 406-07, quoting Anima:l Rescue League v. Asses-
sora of Bourne, 310 Mass. 330, 332, 37 N.E.2d 1019, 1021 (1941). 
§2.3. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 778 281 N.E.2d 602. 
2 G.L., c. 59, §§64-65. 
§2.4. 1 Amending G.L., c. 59, §II. 
2 G.L., c. 21, §l7B. 
SG.L., c. 130, §l05 and c. 131, §40A . 
... G.L., c. 184, §3I. 
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that the restriction has in fact reduced the value of the land and demon-
strating the amount of that reduction will be difficult and expensive be-
cause undoubtedly appraisals will be required. 
In certain cases, however, a request for separate assessment of restricted 
land may backfire or at least be neutralized. This result typically might 
occur when only a part of the owner's land is restricted. While he may 
claim successfully that the restricted land is reduced in value by the re-
striction, the assessors may claim with equal success that the landowner's 
adjacent unrestricted land is benefited by the restriction. The amount 
of the benefit may equal or even exceed the amount of the reduction in 
value. In any event, using this theory, assessors may be able to prevent 
this new statute from having the impact intended. 
§2.5. Tax incentives for property used to control air pollution. 
Chapter 707 of the Acts of 19721 operates to equalize the tax treatment 
of property used to control air pollution with that of property used to 
combat water pollution. Previously both types of property had been 
exempt from taxation but under separate statutory provisions.2 Under 
Section 2 of Chapter 707, the exemption of property used to control 
air pollution is now subject to the same terms, conditions, and definitions 
as the exemption pertaining to property used to control water pollution.3 
Thus, property used to prevent pollution of the atmosphere must now be 
certified by the director of the state agency responsible for control of air 
pollution. 
Section 3 permits an elective deduction from net income for expenses 
incurred in controlling air pollution. Previously such deductions were 
available only for expenses incurred in connection with water pollution 
control. Again, the deductions relating to air pollution control are sub-
ject to the same terms, conditions and definitions as are the deductions 
relating to water pollution control. The deductions are available only 
for property depreciable under Section 167 of the Internal Revenue Code 
and only if the property is certified by the director of the appropriate 
state agency. Also, for air pollution control property the "construction, 
reconstruction, erection or improvement" must have been initiated on 
or after January 1, 1972, and the expenditures must be "paid or incurred" 
prior to January 1, 1980. The corresponding dates for expenditures made 
in connection with water pollution control property are January 1, 1966 
and January 1, 1980. The latter date represents a six year extension over 
the previous deadline. Section 3 applies to all taxable years ending on 
and after December 31, 1972. 
§2.5. 1 Amending G.L., c. 59, §5 and G.L., c. 63, §38D. 
2 G.L.,c. 59, §5 (thirty-ninth and forty-fourth clauses). 
3 For example, "The term 'industrial waste' and the term 'industrial air pollu-
tion: as used in ,this section, shall mean any liquid, gaseous, solid or waste sub-
stance, or a combination thereof, resulting from any process of industry, manu-
facture, trade or business or from the development or recovery of any natural 
resources, which may cause or might reasonably be expected to cause pollution of 
'the waters or the atmosphere of the Commonwealth." (Emphasis added.) 
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B. CORPORATE EXCISE TAXES 
§2.6. Manufacturing corporation. In Franki Foundation Co. v. State 
Tax Commission} the Court was called upon to decide whether the tax-
payer corporation, engaged in the business of making specialized founda-
tion footings for buildings and other structures, was a "manufacturing" 
corporation for Massachusetts tax purposes. The importance of qualify-
ing as a manufacturing corporation is that the machinery of a manu-
facturing corporation is exempt from local property taxes. Instead, it is 
taxed under the corporate excise tax at a much lower rate.2 
The Court found no statutory definition of "manufacturing" but noted 
general language from its earlier decisions indicating that manufacturing 
normally implies" 'the process of transforming raw or finished materials 
by hand or machinery, and through human skill and knowledge, into 
something posse~sing a new nature and name and adapted to a new 
use.' "3 This definition, taken literally, would have supported taxpayer's 
claim that the production of foundation footings was a manufacturing 
process. By reasoning not altogether clear or convincing, the Court re-
jected this claim and concluded that the taxpayer was not involved in 
manufacturing but rather in an integral part of the construction process.4 
The Court found no legislative intent that the manufacturing exemption 
should apply within the construction industry.5 
The Franki decision has not clarified the definition of a manufac-
turing corporation, but it does establish that a corporation engaged in 
the construction industry is not a manufacturing corporation. Because of 
the importance of "manufacturing" for the Massachusetts corporate and 
property tax system, it would have been desirable for the Court to use 
the Franki case to formulate an affirmative definition thereof, or at least 
to list the criteria to be considered in resolving some of the difficult prob-
lems associated with that concept. From this point of view, the Court's 
decision in Franki is unsatisfactory, even though the result is probably 
correct. 
§2.7. Security corporations: Chatham Corp. v. State Tax Commis-
§2.6. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 807, 281 N.E.2d 865. 
2 4 BARRETT AND BAILEY, MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE-TAXATION, §822. 
3 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 807, 811, 281 N.E.2d 865, 868, quoting Commissioner of 
Corp. and Taxation v. Assessors of Boston, 321 Mass. 90, 94, 71 N.E.2d 874, 817 
(1947). 
4 "While it may be difficult in some cases to decide where the manufacturing 
process ends and the construction process begins, this is not such a case .... We 
see no difference between the footings which Franki puts underground at the con-
struction site and the remainder of the building which another contractor com-
pletes above ground on those footings." 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 807, 812, 281 N.E.2d 
865, 869. 
5 Id. at 810-11, 281 N.E.2d at 869. The legislative history, as contained in 1936 
House Doc. No. 143, evinces primarily a concern for "manufacturing" as relating 
to the activities of "mills and factories." 
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sion.1 The Beacon Company, Inc. was a domestic manufacturing corpora-
tion engaged in producing household cleaning goods. On June 15, 1965, 
Beacon entered into a purchase and sale agreement relating to the sale 
of substantially all of its assets. The agreement provided that the acquisi-
tion would become effective on July 7, 1965 and that until that date 
Beacon would "conduct [its] operations according to [its] ordinary and 
usual course of business."2 Beacon did in fact conduct its normal manu-
facturing operations through July 7. Its fiscal year ended June 30, and 
there were three business days of manufacturing operations in its next 
fiscal year, the tax year in question. On July 9, Beacon changed its name 
to Chatham Corporation and thereafter engaged solely in the business 
of buying, selling and holding securities for its own account. 
The issue in Chatham was whether the corporation was entitled to 
be taxed as a so-called "securities corporation" pursuant to Section 38B 
of Chapter 63. Under that section, the tax rates are substantially lower 
than the business corporation tax rates under Section 32. Section 38B 
applies to corporations "engaged exclusively in buying, selling, dealing in, 
or holding seourities in its own behalf and not as a broker" (emphasis 
added). The Court agreed with the State Tax Commission that Chat-
ham was not exclusively a securities corporation during the year in ques-
tion because of the few days of manufacturing operations conducted 
during the first days of the year pursuant to the requirement of the pur-
chase and sale agreement. 
The Court's opinion does not mention one theory put forth by Chat-
ham in its brief.3 Chatham argued that the manufacturing operations for 
the days immediately prior to the effective date of the sale were not 
conducted as Beacon's normal business but were in the nature of pre-
serving the going concern value of the business as required by the pur-
chase and sale agreement. The proposition put forward with some force 
was that the process of liquidation is not a business, and it should not 
suddenly disqualify the company from the tax advantages which it should 
enjoy as a securities corporation, even during liquidation. 
In its brief, Chatham relied on two earlier decisions of the Appellate 
Tax Board involving the same statutory provision and similar fact situa-
tions. A & S Incorporated v. State Tax Commission4 and Arcade Mal-
leable Iron Company v. State Tax Commission5 both involved sales of 
substantially all corporate assets but retention of some of those assets into 
the year in which taxation as a security corporation was sought. In each 
case, the Appellate Tax Board found as fact that the corporation was not 
engaged in a business of selling assets during the pertinent years but 
§2.7. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1297, 285 N.E.2d 420. 
2 Id. at 1297-98, 285 N.E.2d at 421. 
3 Brief for Chatham Corporation, pp. 5-9. 
4 Appellate Tax Board, February 7, 1963, annotated in CCH Mass. Tax Re-
porter n10-430.202. 
5 CCH Mass. Tax Reporter, n200-274 (1968). 
6
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1972 [1972], Art. 5
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1972/iss1/5
42 1970 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETrS LAW §2.8 
rather was holding and selling the assets solely to accomplish its liquida-
tion. Accordingly, they were taxed as security corporations. In neither 
case did it appear that the corporation continued its former business 
operations into the tax year other than for purposes of selling its assets. 
The issue was whether it was in the "business" of selling assets, thereby 
precluding it from engaging exclusively in the securities business under 
Section 38B. 
The Chatham case is distinguishable because the manufacturing, distri-
bution and sale of household products continued into the tax year. Had 
those activities ceased prior to July 1, 1965 and had Beacon continued 
only to hold its assets until the bulk sale on July 7, then the facts would 
be indistinguishable from those in A & S and Arcade. Because the Court 
in Chatham did not mention those cases, it is not clear whether they 
remain good law on their facts, or whether they were overruled sub 
silentio. The briefs on both parties argued extensively over their ap-
plicability and it is unfortunate that the Court did not deal with these 
cases. 
From another view, however, the decision can be questioned. Realis-
tically, Chatham and Beacon were different corporations engaged in dif-
ferent businesses. One could argue that Chatham commenced its cor-
porate existence after the sale and that its tax return covered only the 
short fiscal year beginning on July 8. During that period, Chatham en-
gaged in the securities business exclusively. This result could have been 
accomplished by using other forms of corporate reorganization. . The 
Court's analysis should have recognized the economic and business reality 
of the situation. 
§2.8. Consolidated returns. State Tax Commission v. La Touraine 
Coffee Co.1 focused on the use of consolidated returns by certain cor-
porate families and the treatment of intercompany dividends between 
corporations within a family. 
On April 25, 1964, La Touraine sold all of the stock of Kennedy, its 
wholly-owned subsidiary. Earlier in 1964, Kennedy had paid La Touraine 
a dividend in excess of $275,000. For that taxable year, La Touraine 
and its subsidiaries filed consolidated Federal and Massachusetts cor-
porate tax returns. The returns included the income of Kennedy up to 
the date of the sale but excluded from income the intercompany dividend 
paid by Kennedy to La Touraine. The Commission argued that La 
Touraine and its subsidiaries were not entitled to file a consolidated 
return or to exclude the intercompany dividend. The Appellate Tax 
Board rejected both contentions. 
General Laws, Chapter 63, Section 32(a) (2) provides that two or 
more domestic corporations filing a consolidated Federal return can 
elect to have the net income portion of the corporate excise tax assessed 
upon their "combined net income." The Court concluded that La Tou-
12.8. I 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 977, 282 N.E.2d 643. 
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raine and its subsidiaries had complied with the only requirement of 
that Section when they filed a consolidated Federal return. Thus they 
were entitled to combine their net income for purposes of the state cor-
porate excise tax.2 
On the dividend exclusion issue, the Court took a realistic view of cor-
porate finance and accounting. The purpose of consolidating returns is 
to allow a related group of corporations to be taxed as a single entity. 
On the basis of this analysis, the Court concluded that the transfer of 
funds between Kennedy and La Touraine had no tax consequence for 
purposes of a consolidated return. Accordingly, the Appellate Tax 
Board's decision abating the tax was affirmed. 
C. PERSONAL INCOME TAXES 
§2.9. Low income credit. Roberts v. State Tax Commission1 raised 
the question of the availability of the low-income tax credit2 for a woman 
who was separated in fact from her husband and therefore unable to 
file a joint return, but who still provided a home for their children. The 
credit is not available to "a married individual" unless a joint return is 
filed. 
The taxpayer had been separated from her husband since 1957 but 
had never filed any probate court petition seeking support or other 
relief on the ground that she was living apart for justifiable cause. She 
was the mother of eight children, and if she had been able to file a 
joint return, she would have been entitled to a credit of $68. 
Taxpayer sought a ruling that, because of her long separation from 
her husband and the lack of any support from him, she was not "a 
married individual" within the meaning of Section6B. She buttressed 
her position by reference to another statuteS providing that "an individual 
legally separated from his spouse under a decree of divorce or of separate 
maintenance shall not be considered as married" for purposes of Chapter 
62. The court rejected her argument and held that the taxpayer was a 
married individual and, since she was in fact unable to file a joint return, 
she was not entitled to the credit. 
The Court also rejected her contention that if the statute were con-
strued to include her in the category of married persons, it would deny 
her equal protection by favoring (a) married individuals able and willing 
to file joint returns and (b) married couples legally separated or divorced. 
2 The commission unsuccessfully tried to rely on G.L., c. 63, §38, Clause 6, 
repealed by Acts of 1966, c. 698, §58. This provision conditioned the filing of a 
consolidated tax return upon obtaining pennisston from the state ,tax commission. 
The Court found that ,this provision only applied when consolidated returns were 
not filed at the federal level. 
§2.9. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 25, 277 N.E.2d 499. 
2 G.L., c. 62, §6B which now appears as G.L., c. 62, §6(b). 
3 G.L., c. 62, §61(d), now G.L., c. 62, §1(h). 
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The Court found that tax statutes are not constitutionally required to 
"insure absolute equality of economic impact on all persons," and that 
Mrs. Roberts had not sustained the "very heavy burden of proving that 
the classification cannot be supported on any conceivable basis."4 
A similar question arises under the Internal Revenue Code. The favor-
able tax rate for heads of households is available for certain unmarried 
taxpayers.5 The Code contains an analogous provision6 deeming as un-
married for purposes of the head of household tax individuals living apart 
from a spouse under a divorce or separate maintenance decree. Like the 
Court in Roberts, the federal courts have construed these statutes literally. 
In Wesemann v. Commissioner,7 for example, the Second Circuit held 
that a taxpayer was still married for purposes of the head of household 
test even though a state court had dismissed a divorce action brought by 
taxpayer's spouse on the ground that the taxpayer was justified in living 
apart from his spouse. 
Unlike the Massachusetts legislation, however, the Internal Revenue 
Code provides some relief for a person in the situation of the taxpayer in 
Roberts. Under the Code, a person legally married and filing a separate 
return is not considered to be married for purposes of the head of house-
hold test if that person maintains a home as a household for certain de-
pendents, furnishes over one-half of the cost of such household, and "dur-
ing the entire taxable year such individual's spouse is not a member of 
such household."8 The fact situation in the Roberts case is not an unusual 
one, especially for certain low-income families in the Commonwealth, and 
it appears that the taxpayer would have qualified as a head of household 
for federal tax purposes even though she was still legally married. The 
low-income tax credit of Section 6B was presumably designed to assist 
families in certain economic situations. The Internal Revenue Code ex-
tends the advantageous tax status to those families with economic need, 
without regard for whether there has been a judicial sanction of the 
husband and wife living apart. The Massachusetts statute should be 
amended to provide similar tax relief to those in the situation of the 
taxpayer in Roberts. 
D. SALES AND U SE TAXES 
§2.10. Exemptions. The statutes which the Court was called upon 
to interpret in Rowe Contracting Co. v. State Tax Commission1 were 
those providing exemptions from sales and use taxes for the acquisition 
4 1972 MaliS. Adv. Sh. 25, 28-30, 277 N.E.2d 499, 502-03. 
5 I.R.C., §2(b). 
6 I.R.C., §2(b) (2) (B). 
7 298 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1962). 
8 I.R.C., §§2(c) and 143(b). 
§2.10. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 287, 279 N.E.2d 675. 
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and use of certain property for the purpose of producing tangible per-
sonal property to be sold. Exempted by the statute were: 
(r) Sales of materials, tools and fuel ... which become an ingredi-
ent or component part of tangible personal property to be sold or 
which are consumed and used directly ... in an industrial plant in 
the process of the manufacture of tangible personal property to be 
sold .••. 
(s) Sales of machinery, or replacement parts thereof, used directly 
. . . in an industrial plant in the manufacture, conversion or pro-
cessing of tangible personal property to be sold. . . .2 
The taxpayer was engaged primarily in producing for sale crushed 
stone, manufactured gravel and treated stone. In dispute was the applica-
bility of these statutes to purchases and use of machinery, machinery parts 
and supplies used in the various steps of breaking rock away from its 
rock formation in the ground and changing it into the finished product 
which the taxpayer then sold. 
The issue was whether the property in question was used "in the process 
of the manufacture" or "in the manufacture, conversion Or processing" 
of the finished product which taxpayer sold. The Court first concluded 
that the terms "in the process of the manufacture" appearing in (r) and 
"in the manufacture, conversion or processing" appearing in (s) were 
essentially interchangeable and that the issue was the same under both (r) 
and (s). Having made that initial determination, the Court determined 
that the taxpayer's quarry operation was reasonably integrated, commenc-
ing with the initial separation of rock from the rock formation and con-
. tinuing through various stages until the final product was stockpiled for 
sale and delivery to taxpayer's customers. Each of the pieces of machinery 
and equipment in dispute, other than front-end loaders used primarily 
to load customers' trucks and to mix the stockpiles, was used to assist in 
various stages of this overall process and thus was not subject to the tax. 
The Court referred to the 1971 amendments to the sales tax statute!! 
which were apparently intended to clarify the exemptions in question. 
The exemptions were basically rewritten in 1971 and fairly elaborate 
definitions of certain terms were added. In light of these amendments, 
it is questionable whether a court, facing the same facts as presented in 
Rowe but under the amended statute, would have been able to reach the 
same result. Furthermore, the retention by the legislature in the 1971 
amendments of the distinction between "manufacture" and "manu_ 
facture, conversion or processing" appearing in the 1966 statute which 
was before the Court in Rowe suggests that the legislature intended that 
(r) and (s) raise different issues. Accordingly, the holding of the Court 
2 G.L., c. 64H, §§6(r) and (s), made applicable to use taxes by G.L., c. 641, 
§7(b) . 
3 Acts of 1971, c. 555, §45, amending G.L., c. 64H, §6. These amendments 
were not applicable in the instant case which arose prior to their enactment. 
10
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1972 [1972], Art. 5
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1972/iss1/5
46 1970 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §2.12 
in Rowe that the quoted phrases were interchangeable may have been 
substantially if not totally undermined by the 1971 legislation. 
E. INHERITANCE TAXES 
§2.11. Exemption for legacies to out-of-state charities. In Angevine 
v. Commissioner of Corp. and :Taxation,1 decedent's will left $10,000 
legacies to a hospital and a church in Florida. A charitable deduction 
was allowed for each legacy for Federal estate tax purposes. The In-
heritance Tax Bureau, however, refused to exempt these legacies from 
the Massachusetts inheritance tax. 
The inheritance tax statute2 provided in substance that these legacies 
would be exempt from the Massachusetts inheritance tax if Florida 
"exempt [ ed] from similar taxation" legacies from Floridians to Massa-
chusetts charitable organizations. Florida has no inheritance tax, but it 
does have an estate tax equal to the Federal state death tax credit. The 
issue before the Court was whether in view of the Florida tax structure 
Florida and Massachusetts had reciprocal exemptions for charitable 
legacies. 
The Inheritance Tax Bureau's policy was to permit the exemption 
where legacies were made to charitable organizations in states which 
expressly exempted from their inheritance or estate taxation statutes 
legacies to out-of-state charities. However, it was the Bureau's policy 
not to allow an exemption with respect to states which had no inheritance 
tax.s 
The Court in Angevine had little difficulty in affirming a decree of 
probate court abating inheritance taxes with respect to the legacies to 
Florida charities. Clearly, a state that imposes no inheritance tax at all 
accomplishes the same end result as a state expressly granting reciprocal 
exemptions from inheritance tax. Similarly with respect to the Florida 
estate tax, since the legacies here were deductible and thus did not enter 
into the calculation of the Federal tax, they also did not enter into 
the determination of the Florida estate tax. Thus, a Florida resident 
making these legacies to Massachusetts charities would not have had 
to pay any death tax in Florida. The Court correctly determined 
that such a result is all that is needed to qualify for the Massachusetts 
exemption. 
§2.12. Filing procedures in federal estate tax cases. For yet an-
other year, the statutes and administrative policies of the Inheritance Tax 
Bureau relative to filing inheritance tax returns and paying the tax have 
been revised. Chapter 712 of the Acts of 19721 appears to make a sub-
stantial procedural change for estates where it is necessary to file a 
§2.11. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 803, 281 N.E.2d at 583. 
2 G.L., c. 65, § 1. 
3 4A BARRETT AND BAILEY, MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE-TAXATION, §1105. 
§2.12. 1 Amending G.L., c. 65, §22. 
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Federal estate tax return. However, under the Bureau's interpretation 
of the revised statute,2 the amount of change is much less than would 
be apparent from an analysis of the relevant statute. 
Under the new procedure for Federal estate tax cases, there are three 
important dates with respect to the inheritance tax. The first is the "due 
date of the tax" which is nine months after the decedent's death. On or 
before that date, the decedent's estate must file with the Bureau a letter 
stating that the estate is filing a Federal estate tax return and must pay 
the full amount of the inheritance tax due, based on the information 
contained in the Federal estate tax return as filed with the Internal 
Revenue Service. A preliminary L-19X computation sheet should be 
completed and filed at the same time. Nothing else need be filed at that 
time. The second important date is 60 days after receipt of the Federal 
estate tax closing letter. On or before that date, if adjustments such as 
changes in valuations or disallowance of deductions made in the Federal 
return after audit result in an increase in the Federal tax, the estate 
must file with the Bureau an amended L-19X recomputing the inheri-
tance tax to reflect those final adjustments and must pay any balance of 
the inheritance tax due as shown by the amended L-19X. Nothing need 
be filed at that time if no additional tax is due. The third important 
date is 30 days later or 90 days after receipt of the closing letter. On or 
before that date, the inheritance tax return must be filed. As before, 
the return consists of the various "L-" forms, a copy of the will, a copy 
of the Federal estate tax return, line adjustments and closing letter, etc. 
As a practical matter, most practitioners will probably find it easier to 
file the return within the 60-day period if it is necessary to file a second 
L-19X. 
This procedure applies only in cases where it is necessary to file a 
Federal estate tax return. In other cases, the full return and payment of 
the tax are due within nine months of the decedent's death. 
It is important to note that no interest or penalty can be assessed 
when there is a timely filing of the "nine month letter" and payment in 
full of the tax then shown to be due and when the balance of the tax 
as determined from final Federal figures is paid within 60 days after 
receipt of the closing letter. Formerly, if the amount initially paid was 
not at least 80% of the final tax, the extension was void and the return 
was subject to late filing penalties. 
In addition, provision is made in the new statute for requesting ex-
tensions to file the return. Although available in all cases, an extension 
will most frequently be requested when an extension is received for filing 
the Federal return, and the permissible extension period is tied to the 
2 See memorandum of Thomas B. McDavitt, Chief of the Inheritance Tax Bu-
reau, dated July 24, 1972. Copies of this memorandum may be obtained from the 
Bureau. 
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Federal extension period.3 Any request for extension must be made on or 
before the due date of the tax and the tax reasonably estimated to be due 
must be paid. The old 80% test continues in force in extension cases so 
that the amount initially paid must be at least 80% of the final tax if 
penalties and interest are to be avoided. 
3 Acts of 1972, c. 712, §2, amending G.L., c. 65, §22. 
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